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SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND EXPERTISE: THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS
TESTIMONY IN CASES UTILIZING THE
REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in the work-place is by no means a
new phenomenon. However, its being addressed by the
courts is relatively new. Although Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act' has precluded discrimination based on sex since
its passage, it was not until 1986 that the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB. v. Vinson,2 held that
hostile work environment sexual harassment was actionable
as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.3 With the
decision in Meritor, the Court now recognizes two types of
sexual harassment: hostile environment and "quid pro quo"
harassment. 4 "Quid pro quo," or "this for that" sexual harass-
ment is simply a demand or request for sex or sexual activity
in exchange for some job-related benefit, i.e., raises, promo-
tions, or even keeping one's job.5
Hostile environment harassment is the creation, through
the use of unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in an em-
ployment situation, of an environment that makes an individ-
ual, almost always a woman, uncomfortable to the point of
interfering with her job performance.6 The "conduct" need
not be anything so blatant as physical touching. It can in-
clude verbal harassment, such as suggestive or derogatory
comments, jokes, inappropriate discussions of sexual prac-
tices, and repeated requests for dates when such requests
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
2. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
4. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
5. Id. at 65.
6. See id. In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that actual harm to work performance need not occur to
sustain a cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment. Id. at 370.
Instead, behavior that would interfere with a reasonable person's work per-
formance will be viewed as sufficient to constitute creation of a hostile environ-
ment. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
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are denied.7 Hostile environment harassment also has in-
cluded the creation of a sexually hostile work area through
actions that are not directly aimed at the plaintiff, e.g.,
through the use of nude pin-ups." This comment will address
hostile environment sexual harassment.
With regard to matters of proof, quid pro quo harassment
cases are fairly straightforward. The complainant needs to
prove that there was a demand or request for sexual favors in
exchange for some job benefit.9 Hostile environment harass-
ment, however, immediately raises more difficult questions of
proof. What is a hostile environment? What should be quali-
fied as sexual banter or joking, and what as actual harass-
ment? As will be explained below, in 1991 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Ellison v. Brady,'0 took a significant
step in defining the prima facie case that must be met for a
plaintiff to prevail in a hostile environment action, and in do-
ing so affected problems of proof in such cases. 1
With the creation of the "reasonable woman" standard in
Ellison v. Brady, 12 problems of proof have become somewhat
more complex. The standard establishes that behavior which
would create a hostile work environment for a reasonable wo-
man will be considered harassment, regardless of the inten-
tions or beliefs of the alleged harasser. 13 Although this would
presumably make it easier for female plaintiffs to prevail in
hostile environment cases, it raises interesting problems of
proof.14 What exactly constitutes a reasonable woman is still
7. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
8. E.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
9. Of course, what constitutes a demand or request can become somewhat
difficult to establish. But the basic nature of the charge, the "this for that," is
fairly straightforward.
10. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
11. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
12. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
13. Although the Ellison court expressly applied a "reasonable woman"
standard, its holding supports generally the use of a "reasonable victim" stan-
dard. This would apply a reasonableness standard appropriate to whatever
gender the alleged victim of harassment happened to be. Id. at 878.
14. The presumption that the reasonable woman standard makes it easier
for women to prevail is based on a notion underlying the creation of the reason-
able woman standard: that the perspectives of women have been traditionally
underrepresented in the courtroom. Were these perspectives to be better repre-
sented, the existence of harassment would be more often realized. See infra
notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
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a matter to be determined by the trier of fact. Perhaps the
most obvious question raised by the standard is, to what ex-
tent can men know just what the reasonable woman would
find harassing? More precisely, to what extent can men un-
derstand the position and viewpoints of women sufficiently to
understand the effects of allegedly harassing behavior?
In seeking to establish just what behavior is offensive to
a reasonable woman, some parties have sought to introduce
the testimony of expert witnesses to educate triers of fact as
to exactly what constitutes a reasonable woman standard,
and ultimately, to whether or not certain behavior constitutes
harassment. This creates two problems under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, as they have been interpreted by the
courts: 1) is the matter of what a reasonable woman is or
would find harassing something the jury can determine for
itself, and 2) does the introduction of such testimony actually
aid the jury in determining the ultimate issue of fact? There
is no agreement in the federal courts on these issues, and
they have yet to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court has only recently decided,
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 the proper
standards to be applied with regard to expert witnesses gen-
erally, and it has not yet had the opportunity to address the
use of the reasonable woman standard, much less the use of
expert testimony relating to the standard. There is, however,
some indication that the Court foresees itself addressing the
reasonable woman standard.1 6
This comment examines the rules of evidence and case
law that address the issue of admissibility of expert testi-
mony in hostile environment sexual harassment cases. The
comment first examines the Federal Rules of Evidence as
they relate to the admissibility of expert testimony as a
whole, and the past disagreement as to how these rules
should be interpreted. 17 Although this disagreement has
been settled by the decision in Daubert, "I those cases that
have addressed the use of expert witnesses in sexual harass-
ment cases were decided prior to the Daubert decision. 19 It is
15. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 24-62.
18. See infra discussion accompanying notes 42-56
19. See infra notes 82-117 and accompanying text.
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therefore necessary to examine the evidentiary standards
under which these cases were decided, so as to determine how
these cases might have been differently decided under
Daubert.
This comment then reviews the cases in which the ad-
missibility of expert witnesses in sexual harassment cases
has been considered. 20 During the following analysis portion
of the comment, the connection between the cases and the
rules is examined, as are the ways in which the conclusions of
the cases reflect past differing theories regarding means of
applying the rules, and how these conclusions might be differ-
ent in light of Daubert.21 The rationales of the case decisions
will also be considered in light of the reasonable woman
standard.
The comment then proposes that the use of expert wit-
nesses to testify to the reasonable woman standard is not
only permissible, but necessary.22 Not only are such wit-
nesses of assistance to triers of fact in these cases, but to not
use them would be antithetical to the very notions embodied
in the establishment of the reasonable woman standard. Fi-
nally, the comment will address possible means of making
this necessity a reality, and the actual possibilities that such
will occur.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The Federal Rules of Evidence briefly address the use of
expert witnesses and their testimony as to the ultimate is-
sues of fact. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states, "If scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."23
This rule establishes a two-part test for evaluating the
admissibility of expert witness testimony: 1) the testimony
must be based upon "scientific, technical, or other specialized
20. See infra notes 82-117 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 119-93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
23. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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knowledge," and 2) must "assist the trier of fact to determine
the evidence."24
The first prong of the test serves as the basis for estab-
lishing what type of evidence exists within the realm of "ex-
pert testimony," as opposed to lay opinion. The second prong
of the test asks to what extent the expert testimony will actu-
ally be of aid to the jury or judge in determining issues of
fact, or would merely serve to confuse or mislead it.
1. Frye and the "Acceptance in the Scientific
Community" Standard
To satisfy the first prong of Rule 702, there must first be
a determination that the field of study or type of knowledge to
be addressed by the expert witness is based upon "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge." The seminal case
on the admissibility of types of evidence is Frye v. United
States.25 Although Rule 702 was instituted after the decision
in Frye, the standards established in Frye were for some sev-
enty years still used, although not explicitly, for evaluations
of this first prong.2" Frye can therefore help inform current
applications of Rule 702. In Frye, the admission of evidence
gained from a primitive version of the polygraph or "lie-detec-
tor" test was disallowed,27 because the test itself had not
gained "general acceptance" in the scientific community. 28
Frye thereby established a basic rule of evidence with regard
to expert testimony: that "the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."29
There was, however, significant division in the courts
concerning the applicability of the Frye test. On March 2,
1992, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Chris-
tophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.30 In Christophersen, Plain-
tiffs claimed that decedent Roy Christophersen had died from
24. Id.
25. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26. See e.g. Robert Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility
of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, 52 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., 85, 94-96 (Autumn 1989).
27. Frye, 293 F., at 1014.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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cancer caused by fumes at his place of employment.3 1 Plain-
tiffs sought to substantiate their claim through introduction
of the expert testimony of an internist and toxicologist.3 2 The
district court ruled that an affidavit prepared by the doctor
was "not based upon the type of evidence usually relied upon
by experts in the field of cancer research," and disallowed the
testimony.33 After a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, the court sitting en banc affirmed the district
court decision,3 4 essentially relying on the Frye standard of
general acceptance within the scientific community. 5
Dissenting from the majority decision not to hear Chris-
tophersen, Justices White and Blackmun noted at the time
that there was a division in the federal circuit courts as to
whether the Frye standard or "a lower threshold for deter-
mining the admissibility of expert evidence" should be ap-
plied.3 6 The Justices noted that a number of courts had
found the Frye rule to have been "superseded in 1975 by the
Federal Rules of Evidence."3 7 This "lower standard" to which
the justices refer would allow juries to determine which ex-
pert testimony they find valid.38 The judge would only deter-
mine the expert's status as an expert, according to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702: "[A] witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify ... ."39 Unlike the Frye standard, this standard would
focus not upon the evidence and the extent to which it was
derived by a means acceptable to the scientific community,
but rather upon the expert witness and his or her qualifica-
tions as an expert. 40 An expert applying a new or uncommon
method or theory would simply have to face the skepticism of
the jury and contradictory testimony by the opponent's ex-
31. Id. at 1281 (White, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1280, 1281 (1992)(White, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing United States v. Jakobetz, 60 U.S.L.W. 2470 (2d Cir. 1992);
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d. Cir. 1990)).
38. Rende Cordes, The Jury is Still Out on Expert Witness Standards,
TwA, Feb. 192, at 13.
39. Id.
40. For an examination of the Frye standard, see supra text accompanying
notes 25-29.
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perts. Although Frye predates Rule 702, in practice it was
not rendered irrelevant by Rule 702, but rather was retained
as one of two alternative theories interpreting Rule 702. Be-
cause Christophersen was not heard by the full Court, a uni-
versal standard for the admissibility of expert testimony was
not established. Such a universal standard was established
in 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
41
2. Current Standards of Admissibility: Daubert v.
Merrell Dow
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. finally determined the standards
for district courts to apply in evaluating the admissibility of
expert testimony. In Daubert, the Court held that "the Frye
test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence."42 In so ruling, the Court dispensed with the Frye
requirement that focuses upon "general acceptance" in the
scientific community, as not being in any way incorporated
into Rule 702: "Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes
'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissi-
bility. Nor... [were] Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole...
intended to incorporate a 'general acceptance standard.' "43
The Court's statements concerning the general conflict
between the Frye Rule and the Federal Rules of Evidence is
equally illuminating, in that it describes the key distinction
between the rationales of Frye and the Federal Rules: "[A]
rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with
the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general ap-
proach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion"testimony.' "44
In outlining what standards of admissibility are estab-
lished by Rule 702, the Daubert Court focused upon the
Rule's use of the word "scientific." 5 It stated that "[t]he ad-
jective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and pro-
cedures of science."46 It also focused upon the word "knowl-
edge," stating that the word "connotes more than subjective
41. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
42. Id at 2793.
43. Id. at 2794.
44. Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
45. See id. at 2795.
46. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2789
(1993).
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belief or unsupported speculation."47 The Court concluded
that "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference
or assertion must be derived by the scientific method."48 This
would suggest that the Court did wish to ensure that expert
opinion not be reduced to baseless assertions. At the same
time, however, it wished to expand admissibility standards
beyond Frye to allow for that expert opinion which though not
yet generally accepted within its field, is generated through a
legitimately scientific means. Ultimately, the Court ex-
pressed that its goal was "trustworthiness" and "reliabil-
ity:"4 9 "In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony
pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evi-
dentiary reliability."5 °
In setting forth guidelines by which judges could find "ev-
identiary reliability," the Court mentioned several considera-
tions: whether the theory or technique has been tested,5 '
whether it has been "subjected to peer review and publica-
tion,"52 and to what extent the evidence presented is subject
to error.53 The Court also mentioned as a possible, though by
no means exclusive or even binding consideration, general ac-
ceptance in the scientific community. 54
In explaining the rationale for its decision, the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether or not a standard for expert wit-
nesses more liberal than that of Frye would result in a "'free-
for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd
and irrational pseudoscientific assertions."5 But the Court
found this concern to be minimal, and concluded that juries
are well able to evaluate the relative reliability of expert as-
sertions and their bearing on the cases heard: "Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at n.9.
50. Id. at 2795.
51. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796
(1993).
52. Id. at 2797.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2798.
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and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence."56
3. The Helpfulness of Expert Testimony
The second prong of the test for satisfaction of Rule 702
(determining the extent to which the evidence or expert wit-
ness testimony itself will actually aid the trier of fact, be it
judge or jury) has within it two issues, best summarized by
two questions: 1) Does the trier of fact need expert witness
testimony to determine certain issues, and 2) Will the expert
testimony result in confusion?
The first question goes to notions of just what triers of
fact are expected to know. That is, it begs the question of
whether or not the fact-finder needs an expert to tell it about
the subject. Expert testimony generally not allowable is that
which is within "the common knowledge of the average lay-
man,"57 or "invade[s] the field of common knowledge, experi-
ence, or education" 8 of the trier of fact.
The importance of whether or not expert testimony falls
outside the realm of common experience is directly tied to the
role of a jury or a judge hearing a bench trial. They are triers
of fact, and it is their province to determine the ultimate is-
sues of fact, and ultimately the case at hand.59 The expert's
place as an aid to the trier of fact raises the second question
addressed by the second prong of Rule 702: the value of the
testimony to be presented. Not only must the testimony be of
some worth, but it must also be unlikely to result in confusion
or prejudice, lest it be properly excluded. In United States v.
Scavo,60 the court held that although expert testimony may
be admissible under Rule 702, it can be excluded if its "proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by risks of unfair prej-
udice, confusion or waste of time."61 This language is taken
directly from Rule 403,62 the effects of which on Rule 702 will
56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798
(1993).
57. Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1968).
58. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976).
59. The importance of the juror's duty as a determiner of factual issues is of
course a basic tenet of American jurisprudence. "Trier of fact" is defined as "the
jury and... the court when the court is trying an issue of fact .... ." BLAcK's
LAw DICrIoNARY 1506 (6th ed. 1990).
60. 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979).
61. FED. R. EvD. 702 n.152.
62. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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be discussed further below. 63 Often, the decision that evi-
dence creates prejudice, confusion, or results in a waste of
time is made because it is determined that the evidence ad-
dresses the "ultimate issue of fact" to be considered by the
fact-finder.
B. The Ultimate Issue of Fact
The arbiter of any case is the trier of fact, whether that
case is tried by a jury or a judge at a bench trial. It is the
trier of fact who must ultimately make determinations as to
the "ultimate issue of fact." Logically, the purpose of expert
testimony is to in some way aid in these determinations of
the ultimate issue. According to Rule 702, expert testimony
must "assist the trier of fact," that is, be helpful. 4 Yet the
fact that experts in some way help fact-finders decide the
cases before them and the requirement that experts be help-
ful, while seemingly congruous, are often in opposition.
There is, in fact, a tradition of finding testimony to be not
helpful because it addresses the ultimate issue. Therefore,
"ultimate issue of fact" must be addressed when considering
the admissibility of expert witness testimony.
1. Common Law Exclusion of Expert Witness
Testimony
Because the trier of fact is the determiner of the ultimate
issue of fact, it was for some time universally held that expert
witnesses could only provide evidence, and not state their
opinions as to the ultimate issues of fact.65 The development
of the common law rule in this regard reflected concern with
the "usurping of the province of the jury" as the fact-finder.66
On this basis, expert testimony which directly addressed, and
sought to make a determination of, ultimate issues of fact
was excluded.67 With regard to the type of cases addressed
63. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
64. FED. R. EVID. 702.
65. See Charles T. McCormick, Some Observation Upon the Opinion Rule
and Expert Testimony, 23 TEx. L. REV. 109, 115-21 (1945).
66. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAS AT COMMON LAW § 1920,
(4th ed., 1993); see also EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 (3d
ed., 1984).
67. Id.; see also Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414,423-25
(1952); Jeffrey C. Foster, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony On the Ulti-
mate Issue Before the Jury, 21 CuMB. L. REV. 137, 138 (1989).
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by this comment, such testimony would include an expert's
opinion that sexual harassment had occurred, or even that
the facts as alleged by the complainant constitute sexual
harassment.
2. Modern Developments-Allowing Experts to Testify
to the Ultimate Issue
For some fifty years, there has been a movement away
from the "ultimate issue" exclusion of expert witness testi-
mony. Courts have been increasingly willing to disregard
the traditional "ultimate issue" prohibition and allow ex-
panded scope of expert witness testimony. In 1975, Federal
Rule of Evidence § 704 explicitly abolished the "ultimate is-
sue" rule: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."69 This
trend, to allow experts to address the ultimate issue, is gener-
ally considered helpful in finding the truth. The concept is
that the "ultimate issue" rule unduly limited the amount and
type of evidence that might aid the trier of fact and that to
exclude expert testimony simply on the basis that it ad-
dresses the ultimate issue is "empty rhetoric."70
The importance of preventing expert testimony from in-
vading the province of the fact-finder has not, however, been
wholly forgotten. The notes to Rule 704 refer to the require-
ments that must still be met under Federal Rule of Evidence
702.7 1 According to Rule 702, expert witnesses must still "as-
sist the trier of fact."72 The Advisory Committee notes to
Rule 704 state that "[the abolition of the ultimate issue rule
68. In the 1944 case of People v. Wilson, 153 P.2d 720 (Cal. 1944), a physi-
cian's testimony concerning the necessity of an abortion to save the life of the
mother was allowed, despite the fact that the issue of such necessity was the
ultimate issue before the jury, inasmuch as it would determine the legitimacy of
the abortion. In Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm., 166 N.E. 2d
582 (IM. 1960), another physician addressed the issue of medical causation as
an expert witness. Nor are cases limited to the field of medicine. Dowling v.
L.H. Shattuck, Inc., 17 A.2d 529 (N.H. 1941) allowed engineering experts to
address the proper method of shoring a ditch, and in Schweiger v. Solbeck, 230
P.2d 195 (Or. 1951), an expert gave testimony regarding the cause of a land-
slide; see FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
69. FED. R. EvID. 704.
70. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 1920; see also CLEARY, supra note 66, § 12.
71. FED. R. EVD. 704, advisory committee's note.
72. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions." 7 The
notes point to Rules 701, 71 702, 7  and 40376 stating that
"[t]hese provisions afford ample assurances against the ad-
mission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what re-
sult to reach ....
Of the three basic rules regarding witness testimony, 701
(the rule for lay opinion), 702 (the basic standards for expert
testimony), and 403 (reasons for which testimony may be ex-
cluded), it is the last which provides judges the greatest dis-
cretion in disallowing expert testimony. Rule 403 allows for
exclusion of evidence which may create "the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or [result in] misleading
the jury. .".. 78 As stated above, expert witness testimony
may be excluded under Rule 702 as not helpful to the fact-
finder.7s However, it may also be excluded as falling within
the prohibitions of Rule 403: unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, and misleading the jury.80 Expert witness testi-
mony which goes directly to the ultimate issue before the
court might clearly fall within these areas, and thereby be
prohibited.
C. Applications of the Rules of Evidence in Sexual
Harassment and Discrimination Case Law
As sexual harassment case law has developed, so has the
use of expert witness testimony in such cases, including that
testimony which addresses the ultimate issue."1 There is def-
73. Id. at advisory committee notes.
74. Rule 701 relates only to lay testimony, but requires that lay testimony
be "helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determina-
tion of a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 701(b).
75. Rule 702 requires that the expert testimony relate to "scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge." It also requires that the testimony "assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
FED. R. EVID. 702.
76. Rule 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 403.
77. FED. R. EvD. 704 advisory committee's notes.
78. FED. R. EvD. 403.
79. See supra notes 64, 71-76 and accompanying text.
80. FED. R. EVID. 403.
81. Robert M. Vercruysse & James S. Rosenfeld, Expert Witness Testimony:
A Litigation Issue for Discharge and Discrimination Cases, 1993 MICH. BAR. J.
146.
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initely a lack of agreement, however, as to the admissibility
of such evidence.
1. Inadmissible Testimony-Ward v. Westland
Plastics, Inc.
The first case to address the admissibility of expert wit-
nesses in sexual harassment or sexual discrimination cases is
Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc. 2 In Ward, the Plaintiff
brought a claim of sexual discrimination in compensation,
working conditions, and discharge under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.83 The plaintiff sought to admit the testi-
mony of an expert in discrimination and affirmative action
who would testify that in his opinion the defendant had dis-
criminated against the plaintiff on account of her gender.8 4
The district court refused to admit the testimony of the ex-
pert. 5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals presumed that
the district court had feared the expert would "invade the
province of the jury,"86 yet refrained from treating the exclu-
sion of the witness as reversible error.8 7 The court stated
that "district courts enjoy broad discretion in admitting or re-
jecting evidence, including the testimony of experts."8 8 In so
holding, the court cited Kline v. Ford Motor Co.,89 and in-
cluded this reading of Kline: "[the] district court may properly
refuse to admit expert opinion on the ultimate issue based on
its assessment of the borderline value of the evidence to the
jury." 90
Significant here is the court's evaluation of the value of
the testimony plaintiff sought to present.91 In considering
whether or not plaintiff Ward had been prejudiced by the ex-
82. 651 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 1268.
84. Id. at 1270.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1980).
"Reversible error" is defined as "such an error as warrants the appellate court
in reversing the judgment before it." BLAcies LAW DICTIONARY 543 (6th ed.
1990).
88. Ward, 651 F.2d at 1270.
89. 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975).
90. Ward, 651 F.2d at 1270.
91. The language used gave a reason for refusing ultimate issue testimony
that goes beyond the testimony's merely addressing the ultimate issue. By fo-
cusing on the testimony's "borderline value," the court avoids an accusation
that FED. R. EvD. 704 has not been followed. See id.
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pert's exclusion, the Ward court stated that "the question
whether gender was the basis of differential treatment is not
so technical as to require the aid of an expert to enlighten the
jury or court."9 2 In so stating, the court effectively placed the
issue within the "field of common knowledge" of the trier of
fact.
It should here be noted that the Ward case preceded the
Ninth Circuit's 1990 opinion in Ellison v. Brady9" by ten
years. In Ellison, the court ruled that under Title VII sexual
harassment cases, the determination of whether or not sex-
ual harassment occurred should be made according to "the
victim's perspective,"94 and employed a "reasonable woman"
standard.95 That is, if the conduct proved to be harassing to a
reasonable woman in the same circumstances, it would be
termed harassment in that instance. 96 The recognition of the
reasonable woman standard had two effects. First, it shifted
the focus of determinations of harassment from the perspec-
tive of the accused harasser (did the harasser think his con-
duct was harassing) to the perspective of the victim (would a
reasonable woman have been harassed by the behavior). Sec-
ond, recognition of the reasonable woman standard moved
the court away from previously used standards of reasonable-
ness: the old "reasonable man" or later "reasonable person"
standards, both of which the court found to represent essen-
tially male views of proper behavior. 97 Ellison clearly stands
for the proposition that "courts 'should consider the victim's
perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behav-
ior."'9 8 In adopting the reasonable woman standard, the
court thereby recognized the differing perspectives of men
and women in American society. This result was expressly
realized by the court.99
92. Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1980).
93. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
94. Id. at 878.
95. Id. at 879.
96. Id. at 878-80.
97. Id. at 879.
98. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,878 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting EEOC Com-
pliance Manual (CCH) § 615, 3112, C at 3242 (1988)).
99. "We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a
group, but we believe that many women share common concerns which men do
not necessarily share." Id. at 879. Here the court looked to Kathryn Abrams
who wrote, "[W]omen as a group tend to hold more restrictive views of both the
situation and type of relationship in which sexual conduct is appropriate." Id. at
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It is not clear, therefore, whether or not the Ward deci-
sion would have been the same post-Ellison. Arguably, the
Ward court might have concluded that a reasonable woman
standard does raise issues "technical" enough to necessitate
the use of expert testimony.100
2. Other Exclusions of Testimony
Other cases have excluded similar expert testimony for
other reasons. Perkins v. General Motors Corp. 101 is one such
case. In Perkins, district court Judge Bartlett wrote in an or-
der relating to sanctions that prior to trial he had "made clear
to both parties that no witness would be permitted to testify
about the law on sexual harassment."1 0 2 To this extent, wit-
nesses were prohibited from testifying to the ultimate issue of
fact. The witness, Karen C. Wagner, who has a background
in women's issues 0 3 was, however, recognized as an expert
qualified to testify to matters regarding the effects that har-
assment can have on employees and the appropriate re-
sponses of employers to allegations of sexual harassment.1
0 4
879 n.9 (quoting Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transforma-
tion of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1205-6 (1989)).
100. The reasonable woman standard itself casts doubt on the legitimacy of
the Ward decision in that there is, in creating the reasonable woman standard
and recognizing the different perspectives of men and women, an implication
that evaluations of reasonableness in the sexual harassment context are not
simple. Reasonableness depends on factors and perspectives not apparent to
all jurors. Identification of reasonableness in this context may therefore be
technical enough a matter to require expert testimony. See infra notes 71-73
and accompanying text.
101. 129 F.R.D. 655 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
102. Id. at 667.
103. "Women's issues" is a broadly-read term that can encompass, among
other things, a host of subject matters dealing with women, feminist literary
and legal criticism, and sociological studies of women's perspectives. The ex-
pert at hand, Karen Wagner, had worked for the Working Women's Institute,
which studies sexual harassment in the workplace, had received her Master's
degree in social work, and had served as a consultant to both management and
employees regarding sexual harassment. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505-06 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
104. Perkins, 129 F.R.D. at 666-67. Judge Bartlett noted that Ms. Wagner
had previously been found competent to testify as an expert regarding "the im-
pact of harassment on the job on individual employees and the appropriate re-
sponse that employers should make to harassment on the job." Id. at 667
(quoting Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 283-84 (N.D. Ind.
1985)). Judge Bartlett's refusal to admit portions of Ms. Wagner's testimony
was based instead on plaintiff's intention to have her testify concerning sexual
harassment law, and the extent to which the actions of defendant actually con-
stituted sexual harassment. Perkins, 129 F.R.D. at 666-67.
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Neither of these matters would appear to address the ulti-
mate issues of fact, which were allegations of both a sexually
hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment.10 5  However, it might be noted that employers' im-
proper responses to sexual harassment claims can in some
cases be determinative of liability.10 6 The extent to which
Ms. Wagner testified to such matters is not clear; but it
should be noted that here again her testimony ran the risk of
addressing actual matters of law.
The testimony of Karen Wagner was also at issue in Lip-
sett v. University of Puerto Rico.10 7 Here her testimony was
excluded because of the court's determination that the jurors
were themselves able to determine the extent to which the
work environment was "intimidating, hostile, and offen-
sive." l 08 It was the court's concern that the testimony of Ms.
Wagner would "usurp[ I] ... the prerogative of the jury as the
fact finder and would not assist the jury in understanding the
evidence or determining a main issue of fact in [the] case
"109
105. Id. at 656.
106. Improper employer responses to allegations of sexual harassment can
themselves lead to liability. Although employers are not per se liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the harassing actions of the victim's co-
workers, an employer can be held liable if he knew or should have known of the
behavior. Clearly, once a complaint has been made, the employer is aware of
the harassment. The possibility of liability for the employer is then determined
by the employer's actions. The importance of disciplinary measures was indi-
cated in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991): "employers should im-
pose sufficient penalties to assure a workplace free from sexual harassment."
Id. at 882. The Ellison court also applied a standard established in Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983), in which the court held that employer action
following a confirmed claim of sexual harassment must be "reasonably calcu-
lated to end the harassment." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (quoting Katz, 709 F.2d
at 256). See also Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992). In In-
tlekofer, the court found that although an employer, the Veterans Administra-
tion, had conducted a full investigation, and had taken steps to end the harass-
ment, it was liable because the remedies it chose were not of a disciplinary
nature. Id. at 779.
107. 740 F. Supp. 921 (D.P.R. 1990).
108. Id. at 925 (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482
(3d Cir. 1990)).
109. Id.
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3. Admitted Testimony-Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc.
In contrast to Lipsett and Ward is a more recent case,
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,11° where the testi-
mony of Ms. Wagner was again at issue. Here, district court
Judge Melton allowed the testimony of an expert witness
speaking to issues of sexual harassment and what might con-
stitute it."' In doing so he referred to and contrasted the
case before him with the Lipsett decision. The simple distinc-
tion drawn by Judge Melton was that his case was a bench
trial; Lipsett was heard by a jury. 1 2 It was Judge Melton's
opinion that he might need the expert testimony to educate
himself to what constitutes a "reasonable woman,"113 as es-
tablished by Ellison v. Brady.14 He accepted the possibility
that a jury would be able to establish the reasonable woman
for itself, presumably because of the presence of women on
the jury.115
It should here be noted that although the Supreme Court
has not yet explicitly addressed the use of the reasonable wo-
man standard, it has recently referred to the use of the vic-
tim's perspective. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.," 6 the
Court stated that to find hostile environment harassment the
standard "requires an objectively hostile or abusive environ-
ment-one that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive-as well as the victim's subjective perception that
the environment is abusive."17 This reference to "the vic-
tim's subjective perception" recognizes the importance of
viewing harassment from the harassed's perspective, rather
than an abstract notion of behavior, and can therefore be
read to support usage of the reasonable woman standard. At
the very least it does not reject the standard.
110. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
111. Id. at 1505.
112. Id. at 1507 n.4.
113. Id.
114. 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1507 n.4
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
116. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
117. Id. at 368.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The problem that exists in determining whether or not to
admit the testimony of experts testifying to the reasonable
woman standard is two-fold. First, although Daubert"8 de-
cided the proper admissibility standards for expert witnesses,
the admissibility of experts on the reasonable woman is still
undecided. With the rejection of the Frye rule, the opinions of
such experts no longer need to be generally accepted in a rele-
vant scientific community. However, their field of expertise
itself is not yet universally accepted, and it is not clear that
the establishment of the reasonable woman standard will in
and of itself establish study of the reasonable woman as a
field of expertise. Second, even given this area of expertise,
courts might still determine that the testimony would not be
helpful to the trier of fact, either because it is misleading,
prejudicial, or causes confusion-this last perhaps because it
addresses the ultimate issue of fact. These issues, the con-
nections between them, and the ways they have been ad-
dressed by the courts will be considered in the following
section.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Understanding the Rulings in Terms of the Federal
Rules of Evidence
All the sexual harassment cases addressed above in
which the admissibility of expert testimony was at issue were
decided subsequent to the revision of the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence in 1975. They must therefore be evaluated with re-
spect to the requirements of the Rules, and in light of the dif-
fering theories of the applicability of the Frye rule that
preceded Daubert.11 9
1. Acceptance in the Scientific Community-The Frye
Standard
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, there
was no agreement on the proper standard to apply when
evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony.1 20 In deter-
mining whether or not an expert is acceptable under the lan-
118. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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guage of Rule 702, i.e., whether the expert brings to the court
the requisite "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge,"121 the Frye standard was often applied.'22 The Frye
standard, inasmuch as it seeks to require a "scientific com-
munity" standard, proved particularly problematic when ad-
dressed in hostile environment sexual harassment cases.
The problems in establishing the existence of this scientific
community were addressed in Lipsett and Ward.
a. Lipsett and Ward
In both the Ward and Lipsett decisions are indications
that there is no accepted area of expertise regarding what
constitutes sexual harassment. The Ward court refused to
find exclusion of an expert to be reversible error largely be-
cause it felt an expert to be unnecessary. 123 Simply put, the
court determined that whether or not gender was the cause of
discrimination is something that jurors could determine for
themselves. 124 This implies a failure to satisfy the require-
ments of the Frye rule. If an area is not so technical as to
require an expert, then the area is not even one in which the
term "expert" can be applied; therefore, there is no area of
expertise. If there is no area of expertise, then there is no
"scientific community" against whose standards an expert's
theories or methodologies can be judged for satisfaction of the
Frye test. In this light, the Ward court's exclusion of the ex-
pert might have been different had it followed Daubert.
Although the court did not explicitly rely on Frye, it would
stand to reason that the more liberal test of Daubert's inter-
pretation of Rule 702 would have informed the Ward court of
a preferred tendency to admit expert testimony. However, in
that the Ward decision seemed to rest more upon objections
concerning experts addressing ultimate issues of fact, it is
possible that it would be unchanged even after Daubert.
Lipsett contained a far more explicit rejection of the
existence of a field "sufficiently technical" to constitute areas
of expertise. In generally describing what constitutes
"[e]xperts in the traditional professions," the court considered
121. FED. R. EVID. 702.
122. See Mosteller, supra note 26, at 94-96.
123. See infra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
124. Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1980).
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general standards of professional training. 12 5 The court
stated that "experts begin to develop their qualifications long
before they are admitted to their particular professional
school, because they must attend individual colleges and ma-
jor in fields of study that prepare them for graduate
school."' 26 The court also examined the high selectivity of
professional schools.127 Finally, and perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the court then discussed the "deep respect for truth
and ethics which are of great importance in [experts'] prac-
tice"' 28 and the fact that this respect ensures the court that it
and the jury "will receive objective testimony and the truth as
seen by the professional." 2 9
The court then stated that "the education and experience
of Ms. Karen Wagner and Ms. Mercedes Rodriguez, proposed
experts in the area of sexual harassment, fail to rise to the
level of specialized knowledge we deem necessary to qualify
them as experts, and that their testimony would not possess
the professional safeguards ensuring objectivity." °3 0 In this
regard, the court simply rejected the qualifications of two pro-
posed experts. But the court's refusal to qualify them was
also based on its interpretation of the study of sexual harass-
ment as not containing a field of expertise.
The court held that "the jury does not need additional
enlightenment on this particular issue: the subject does not
lend itself to expert testimony because it deals with the com-
mon occurrences that the jurors have knowledge of through
their experiences in everyday life and their attitudes toward
sexual matters."' In holding that jurors are able to deter-
mine for themselves what constitutes an intimidating, hos-
tile, and offensive work environment, the court found, as was
implied in Ward, 13 2 that there is no area of "expertise" that
may properly address the facts. Nor did the Lipsett court rely
on Frye. In asserting this basis for excluding the testimony,
the Lipsett court's decision, like that of Ward, might be ex-
pected to be unaffected by application of a Daubert rationale.
125. Lipsett v. University of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.P.R. 1990).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 923-24.
129. Id. at 924.
130. Lipsett v. University of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D.P.R. 1990)
131. Id. at 925.
132. Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1980).
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But again, the liberal standard of Daubert suggests a lower
standard of admissibility than had previously often been pre-
sumed. The Lipsett court feared that "the proposed expert's
testimony in this case would not bring to the jury 'anything
more than the lawyers can offer in argument.' "133 But
Daubert can be read to indicate that even testimony of this
nature should be included. Daubert refers to the Supreme
Court's disdain for pessimism regarding "the capabilities of
the jury, and of the adversary system generally."'3 4 It would
seem that opposing and contradictory experts, even those
which do little more than echo counsel, are in keeping with
"the adversary system." Although these experts may be, in
the minds of a judge, of minimal value, they do not appear to
be ripe for exclusion under Daubert, in that such valuations
are to be left to the fact-finder rather than the trial judge.
b. Indications of Expertise-Perkins and Robinson
and Indications of a Daubert Rationale
As was made clear in the Christophersen dissent, many
courts applied a standard more liberal, or "lower," than that
established by Frye, even before Daubert was decided.1
3 5
This standard merely requires a judicial determination that
the expert to be presented is an expert in his or her field, and
utilizes the scientific method.' 36 It does not require that the
evidence or testimony this expert will present meets the Frye
standard of acceptance within the scientific community. 3
7
This standard is far more like that established in Daubert.
Perkins and Robinson, in utilizing this looser standard, give
some indication of how courts might rule on the admissibility
of reasonable woman experts after Daubert. In Perkins,
although the testimony of Karen Wagner was ultimately dis-
allowed, there were explicit statements by the court that her
testimony would be acceptable in a context other than a di-
rect addressing of the law.13 8 Judge Bartlett recognized that
133. Lipsett, 740 F. Supp. at 925 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d
1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986)).
134. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798
(1993).
135. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text
137. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text
138. "I think her expertise is established generally with respect to harass-
ment on the job site, primarily sexual harassment and the effects of that on
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Ms. Wagner is "an experienced social worker with an exten-
sive background in women's issues."13 9 Also noted was the
fact that Ms. Wagner's expert testimony had been accepted
by other courts. 140  This might imply that the testimony
would have been allowed under the standards identified in
either Frye or Daubert. 141
The decision not to allow the expert's testimony in Per-
kins was not based on the evidence somehow failing the Frye
standard, but instead upon Plaintiff's intention that the ex-
pert testimony address matters of law.142 In evaluating Ms.
Wagner's testimony in another case, Broderick v. Ruder,
1 43
Judge Bartlett observed that "[tihe opinion does not state
whether Wagner's opinion about the stress effects [of harass-
ment] was based on a hypothetical question or whether Wag-
ner was qualified to opine on whether plaintiff had in fact
been subjected to a sexually hostile work environment. " 144
Considering Judge Bartlett's statement that "no witness
would be permitted to testify about the law on sexual harass-
ment,"145 one might presume that in Broderick he would have
disallowed testimony regarding both whether or not sexual
harassment had existed in the situation then before the
court, and that which answered hypothetical questions ask-
ing whether certain situations constitute hostile environment
harassment. But it does seem possible that although Judge
Bartlett would object to expert testimony which addressed
what a hypothetical woman would find harassing, he would
employees and the method of appropriate response by employers." Perkins v.
General Motors Corp., 129 F.R.D. 655, 667 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
139. Id. at 666.
140. Plaintiff offered into evidence a portion of the trial transcript from Mof-
fett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985), in which the district
court judge commented upon Ms. Wagner's testimony in the following terms:
"She's testified primarily about the effects of harassment on individual workers
and the appropriate response for employers to make to activities of harassment;
and with respect to the matters about which I understand her to have testified,
its absolutely clear to me that she is an expert." Perkins, 129 F.R.D. at 667
(emphasis added).
141. In that the Perkins and Robinson courts used a more liberal standard
than that of the Frye rule, the rulings were more akin to those that will be
found under the Daubert rule. By finding Ms. Wagner "experienced" and there-
fore credible, Judge Bartlett allows for another inference that he would find her
methods credible according to the Daubert test.
142. Perkins, 129 F.R.D. at 666-67.
143. 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
144. Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 129 F.R.D. 655, 668 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
145. Id. at 666.
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not object to testimony regarding whether or not the plaintiff
herself had been harassed. But Perkins's refusal to admit the
testimony should not be read as concluding that expert testi-
mony which addresses what women find to be harassing be-
havior is necessarily in conflict with the Frye rule. Frye ex-
cluded testimony which is based on methods not accepted
within the scientific community; the Perkins exclusions were
based on the inadmissibility of testimony regarding the ulti-
mate issues before the court, i.e., regarding matters of law.
A clear substantiation of the legitimacy of expert testi-
mony in sexual harassment cases is to be found in Robinson
v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc..146 Once again the testimony
of Ms. Wagner was at issue. She testified to "common pat-
terns and responses to sexual harassment and remedial
steps."14 v The court here found Karen Wagner to be well-
qualified to testify: "Ms. Wagner is a self-employed consult-
ant in the area of issues regarding women in the work envi-
ronment, with particular emphasis on the prevention of sex-
ual harassment on the job."148 The court recognized her more
than seven years experience with an organization that stud-
ies sexual harassment, her experience teaching sexual har-
assment courses to managers and human relations special-
ists, as well as her experience as a consultant. 149 The court
also noted her master's degree in social work.150 Ultimately,
the court "accepted Ms. Wagner... as an expert on common
patterns and responses to sexual harassment and ... as an
expert in education and training relative to sexual
harassment."15 1
Clearly, the Robinson court recognized Ms. Wagner's
qualifications. More significantly, unlike the Lipsett court it
recognized the legitimacy of her field. This is a necessary in-
ference to be drawn from the decision: if an individual may be
qualified as an expert in the study of sexual harassment, then
there must clearly be a legitimate field of study of sexual har-
assment. If Judge Melton's admission of the expert in Robin-
son is to be taken as in accord with the Frye standard, then it
146. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
147. Id. at 1505.
148. Id. at 1505-06.
149. Id. at 1506.
150. Id.; see also supra note 142.
151. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1507 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
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must be accepted that there exists a field of study that would
include expertise in the area of sexual harassment. His ad-
mission of the expert also indicates a satisfaction of the lower
Rule 702 standard identified in Christophersen, requiring es-
tablished status as an expert in a given field.15 2 The decision
is thereby also in line with Daubert, requiring legitimate sci-
entific method.
2. Expert Testimony in Light of the Reasonable
Woman Standard
In establishing the reasonable woman standard, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly emphasized the im-
portance of "focus[ing] on the perspective of the victim."153
In doing so, it recognized that "[a] complete understanding of
the victim's view requires, among other things, an analysis of
the different perspectives of men and women."1 54 This differ-
ence of perspective is essential to substantiate the legitimacy
of expert witness testimony under the requirements of Rule
702 and Daubert. Given the differing perspectives of men
and women, it is quite possible that a fact-finder simply has
neither the experience nor the education to know what consti-
tutes the reasonable woman. More to the point, the fact-
finder might not know what behavior a woman might reason-
ably find harassing in a particular circumstance. The expert
on harassment and its effects may become not only useful but
essential for the purpose of educating a jury or judge.
152. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
153. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
154. Id. The court here referred to a variety of sources to substantiate the
existence of these differing perspectives. It noted Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Plural-
ist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harass-
ment, 99 YALE L. J. 1177, 1207-08 (1990), which asserts that "men tend to view
some forms of sexual harassment as 'harmless social interactions to which only
overly-sensitive women would object.'" See Abrams, supra note 98, at 1203 (ar-
guing that "the characteristically male view depicts sexual harassment as com-
paratively harmless amusement"). The Ellison court also looked here to two
cases, one of which was, ironically, Lipsett v. University of P. R., 864 F.2d 881
(1st Cir. 1988): "[a] male supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legiti-
mate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a 'great figure' or 'nice
legs.' The female subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive."
Id. at 898. Although the Lipsett court recognized these differing perspectives, it
apparently did not consider knowledge of them to be outside the common expe-
rience of the jurors.
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This was particularly true in Robinson. Robinson was a
bench trial, tried by a male judge.155 This fact was key to
Judge Melton's decision to admit the testimony of Karen
Wagner. In his opinion, he referred to the decision in Lipsett
not to admit the expert, and found that Lipsett and Robinson
were essentially different in that the former was tried by a
jury, the latter by a judge: "The Lipsett case, however, is a
jury action and may be distinguished for this reason. For in-
stance, Ms. Wagner's testimony ... directly informs the in-
quiry into the effect of the conditions at JSI on the psychologi-
cal well-being of the hypothetical reasonable woman."156 The
opinion further states that "[w]hatever merit lies in the argu-
ment that jurors may draw on their common experiences to
assess the issue, the court risks injustice if it attempts to
fashion a reasonable woman's reaction out of whole cloth."
157
The importance of these statements lies not so much in their
distinction between judge and jury trials, but between the
common experiences of men and women and the likelihood of
different perspectives between the genders. In admitting his
inability to determine "a reasonable woman's reaction,"
Judge Melton recognized that what a reasonable woman is
cannot properly be determined by a man who is without the
aid of an expert. Only once the man has been educated as to
what behavior would be harassing to a reasonable woman
may he then determine if the facts in a given case constitute
harassment.
The contrary decision in Lipsett should not be taken as
an absolute rebuttal of this view. Although the Lipsett court
did address the differing perspectives of men and women,
1
'
5 8
its opinion precedes the creation of the reasonable woman
standard in Ellison. Given this standard, it may well have
ruled differently, in that the standard can be interpreted as
establishing a field of expertise. 159 Essential to the Lipsett
court's exclusion of the expert testimony was not so much its
determination that a jury could establish reasonable behavior
for itself, but that Ms. Wagner and Ms. Rodriguez were not
155. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1507.
156. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1507 n.4
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
157. Id.
158. Lipsett v. University of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D.P.R. 1990).
159. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
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experts in a recognized field.160 The court was willing to rely
on the "common occurrences that the jurors have knowledge
of through their experiences in everyday life .... "161 This
language highlights the fact that there are various ways to
exclude expert testimony. The fact that the subjects to which
the experts were to testify were part of "common experiences"
serves as a reason to find expert testimony unnecessary. The
"common experiences" also provide a reason to find no area of
expertise at all; that which is common knowledge is clearly
not an area of expertise. But the Ellison court's opinion re-
jects the theory that jurors, at least male jurors, can make
necessary determinations based solely on their own exper-
iences and perspectives. Given this inability of juries, the
Lipsett case, even though a jury trial, might have been de-
cided differently after the Ellison decision to utilize the rea-
sonable woman standard.
3. Legitimacy of Expert Testimony in Similar Contexts
Expert witness testimony that might address the reason-
able woman standard is cultural testimony. That is, it seeks
to define a cultural norm, here the views of American wo-
men's culture on the subject of sexual harassment. This type
of evidence is often referred to as "social framework evi-
dence."' 62 This evidence frequently appears in the context of
rape cases. 163 Here, evidence of "rape trauma syndrome" is
introduced to explain the behavior of rape victims following
an attack. 64 The analogy to be drawn between these situa-
tions and expert testimony involving the reasonable woman
is that both circumstances involve reliance upon an expert's
understanding of social framework. Rape trauma syndrome
seeks to explain behavior not with reference to a specific vic-
tim's actions, as might be explained by a psychologist or other
type of expert, but through an explanation of what behavior
is typical in a given social framework. 165 Specifically, an ex-
160. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
161. Lipsett, 740 F. Supp. at 925.
162. E.g., Mosteller, supra note 26, at 133 (explaining that social framework
evidence attempts to explain witness testimony by putting into its proper cul-
tural context, that is, by explaining how the testimony must be considered in
light of the background of the witness).
163. Id. at 135-38.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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pert might testify to expected victim reactions following a
rape.166 In like manner, an expert in sexual harassment
might testify as to the expected reactions of a reasonable wo-
man to certain allegedly harassing actions. The "reactions"
could include simply feeling harassed. In this way, the expert
would be testifying as to whether or not a reasonable woman
would have been harassed by a certain environment.
This type of evidence has, in a few instances, been explic-
itly codified. California has amended its evidence code to al-
low for the introduction of expert witness testimony concern-
ing phenomena such as "battered women's syndrome," a
typical response of victims of domestic violence. 167 There are,
however, no federal codifications regarding the admissibility
of evidence that could be defined as social framework
evidence.
The importance of social framework evidence in sexual
harassment trials has been identified by Professor Mary T.
Coombs. 168 She writes: "Women's true stories of acquain-
tance rape and hostile environment sexual harassment ...
tend to be complex, ragged, and contradictory, reflecting...
the incoherence and contradictions of contemporary sexual
mores .... "169 Therefore, social framework evidence is help-
ful in explaining the complexities of both the individual's cir-
cumstances and of the social context in which they arise.
Professor Coombs also notes that "[t]he cultural scripts that
the jurors bring to the court indirectly influence the stories
they will be told."170 Expert witnesses should therefore be
used to compliment the "cultural scripts" and preconceptions
of the jurors. These witnesses can bring forth the perspec-
tives that are so often not recognized in the courtroom, in this
case the perspectives of women in a work environment.171 In
Robinson, Judge Melton was reticent to determine the rea-
sonable woman out of "whole cloth."1 72 Perhaps he was also
reticent to do so while laboring under his own preconceptions.
166. Id.
167. CAL. Evm. CODE. § 1107 (West 1993).
168. Mary T. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEx. J. OF WOMEN & THE
LAw 277 (1993).
169. Id. at 290.
170. Id. at 291.
171. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
172. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1507 n.4
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Another analogous situation involves the introduction of
expert testimony as to the reasonable behavior of an individ-
ual in a particular profession. As does social framework testi-
mony, this seeks to establish a standard of behavior or per-
ception with which the jury may be unfamiliar. A frequently
appearing example is testimony concerning the "reasonable
physician." In these instances, expert testimony helps inform
the jury as to whether or not a physician's behavior was rea-
sonable in a given set of circumstances, when statute re-
quires reasonable behavior. Examples of the admission of
this evidence can be found in Bunting v. United States173 and
Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.174 In both cases, a physi-
cian's reasonableness was at issue; in both cases, expert testi-
mony as to standards of a "reasonable physician" was admit-
ted. The introduction of this type of evidence of course differs
from that in sexual harassment trials utilizing the reason-
able woman standard. An expert testifying to the reasonable
physician evaluates the perceptions and behaviors of the av-
erage individual in the same position as the defendant. In
sexual harassment cases, the expert gives testimony regard-
ing the perceptions of the victim. But in each instance, it is
an individual's perceptions or behaviors which are at issue.
In this way the situations are analogous, and cases such as
Bunting and Thomas can stand for the proposition that ex-
pert witness testimony such as that recommended in this
comment is indicated by precedent.
Even once the legitimacy and necessity of expert testi-
mony in the sexual harassment context is established, the
consideration of that testimony's admissibility is not at an
end. Judges must still determine whether or not that testi-
mony will fail to be helpful in the sense that it may mislead
or otherwise prejudice the jury. 75 General considerations of
"helpfulness" and the extent to which an expert's addressing
the ultimate issue of fact mitigate against helpfulness must
therefore be examined.
173. 884 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1989)
174. 949 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1992)
175. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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B. Helpfulness to the Finder of Fact and the Ultimate
Issue
As has been outlined in the background to this comment,
Federal Rule of Evidence 704 disallows the exclusion of ex-
pert testimony simply because that testimony will address
the ultimate issue to be determined by the finder of fact.
1 76
But judges, while not necessarily referencing the Rules di-
rectly, have used the standards of helpfulness to the jury,
avoidance of prejudice, confusion of the issues, and mislead-
ing the jury found in Rules 702 and 403 to exclude expert tes-
timony in sexual harassment cases. Even if the Daubert
standard is applied, these limits must still be addressed by
those seeking to introduce expert testimony.
1. Helpfulness to the Jury
In the previous sections, the Ellison court's establish-
ment of the reasonable woman standard was recognized to
have identified an area that might be beyond the understand-
ing of the fact-finder.177 In so doing, it created the possibility
of an area of expertise, one in which some courts had previ-
ously allowed for expert testimony.178 If hostile environment
sexual harassment and the conditions that create it are areas
to be addressed by experts, then they by definition are areas
in which juries and judges sitting at bench trial might benefit
from expert testimony. This can be attributed to two factors:
the special perspective of women, and the special perspective
of those within the workplace.
The existence of differing perspectives of men and women
was identified in Robinson, Ellison, and even Lipsett.179 It is
fairly clear then that men would benefit substantially from
experts explaining to them what is commonly perceived by
women as harassing behavior. The Lipsett court was satis-
fied with the fact that even though men and women have dif-
ferent perspectives, men are aware of what these perspec-
tives are.18 0 The Robinson court was not so certain, and
therefore allowed expert testimony regarding the matter.'
8
'
176. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
180. See Lipsett v. University of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D.P.R. 1990).
181. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
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The Lipsett opinion might be interpreted to hold that the
presence of women on a jury is sufficient for the education of
the men on the jury. The Robinson court, in distinguishing
its case from Lipsett primarily on the basis of the difference
between judge and jury trials, contains nothing to refute such
a contention. But simply relying on the perspectives of indi-
vidual jurors is insufficient to ensure that a jury is capable of
applying a reasonable woman standard. In addition, to do so
puts a heavy burden on female jury members. As was illus-
trated in Ellison, there exist "ingrained notions of reasonable
behavior fashioned by the offenders."18 2 It seems unlikely
that a female juror (whose presence is not itself even guaran-
teed) could single-handedly successfully contradict such "in-
grained notions." If women's views are marginalized gener-
ally, why would they not be in a jury room? Most
significantly, there is no guarantee that a female juror's opin-
ion will be given the weight that would be given a qualified
expert, recognized by the court. And if male jurors were to
give female jurors such deference in these matters, there is
some risk that the female jurors would gain inordinate influ-
ence over deliberations. Finally, although jurors must fre-
quently put themselves in the place of plaintiffs, there are cir-
cumstances apart from gender that might make this
impractical or impossible.
Hostile environment sexual harassment arises in the em-
ployment context. The workplace doubtlessly has its own so-
cial framework. Even if a female juror were able to educate
her male counterparts to some of the realities of having a
woman's (as opposed to a man's) perspective, she might not
be able to educate them about the perspective of a woman in
the workplace. As was observed in Robinson, "Men and wo-
men respond to sex issues in the workplace to a degree that
exceeds normal differences in other perceptual reactions be-
tween them."18 3 Therefore, even if women jurors or judges
could make determinations concerning the reasonable wo-
man without the aid of an expert witness, they might well be
182. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Lipsett v.
University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted)).
183. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (citing 4 Trial Transcript at 198) (emphasis added)). Simply put, the
difference between male and female perspectives is even greater in a workplace
context.
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unable to do so with reference to that reasonable woman in a
specific work context. In this light, the helpfulness of experts
becomes clear not only with reference to differences in gender
but to differences in working conditions as well.
2. Avoidance of Prejudice, Confusion of the Issues and
Misleading the Jury
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that "evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury .... -"s4 No federal court hear-
ing a sexual harassment case has excluded expert testimony
explicitly with reference to Rule 403, or for any of the reasons
the Rule enumerates. It is foreseeable that a court could be
concerned with the influence experts have. However, this
concern can be eliminated as it has been in so many other
contexts: with experts introduced by each side. In Robinson,
the defendants offered the testimony of an expert who stated
that the alleged behavior would not harass a reasonable wo-
man. 1 5 In such a circumstance, the court could determine
that although the use of one expert might mislead or preju-
dice the jury, the use of two experts offering contradictory tes-
timony would eliminate the possibility of misleading or preju-
dicial testimony. In addition, the jury or judge would still be
making the ultimate determinations of reasonableness. Ex-
perts would only help inform those determinations.
3. Testimony Regarding the Ultimate Issue Before the
Court
As indicated above, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 allows
for expert testimony even if it addresses the ultimate issue to
be addressed by the finder of fact. 1 6 But the prohibitions
against such testimony are still inferred from Rules 403 and
702,187 which are read to provide "assurances against the ad-
mission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what re-
sult to reach."188 If expert testimony is determined to be ad-
missible with regard to a recognizable area of expertise and
184. FED. R. EVID. 403.
185. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1507-08.
186. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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helpful to the jury in terms of defining what behavior a rea-
sonable woman would find to be harassing, it may still be ex-
cluded as not helpful in the sense that it addresses ultimate
issues.
Such was clearly the case in Perkins. Here, the judge ex-
plicitly excluded all expert testimony which would directly
address "the law on sexual harassment."1 9 The expert testi-
mony that was to be introduced in this case would have done
so.190 But this should not preclude expert testimony in this
area entirely. There is a variety of expert testimony that
would not simply define the law. If an expert were to testify
to what a reasonable woman would or would not find harass-
ing, that expert would only be defining a standard of reason-
able behavior or response to behavior. It is true that when
the reasonable woman standard is applied, it in large part
determines the law to be applied. However, testifying as to
what responses (i.e., to certain allegedly harassing behavior)
are reasonable in general still allows a jury or judge acting as
fact-finder to determine reasonable behavior in the circum-
stances before the court, and to determine if it was reason-
able that a plaintiff felt harassed.
The court in Robinson was a bit more liberal with its al-
lowance of testimony that addresses matters of law. It found
that expert testimony would be helpful in defining "the hypo-
thetical reasonable woman." 191 The expert did not testify
that the plaintiff herself would reasonably have felt harassed,
but rather what actions generally would constitute harass-
ment. 192 This is testimony concerning matters of law to the
extent that it defines the reasonable woman. But it avoids
the concerns that testimony not address the ultimate issue of
fact. The use of a hypothetical reasonable woman avoids a
circumstance in which an expert asserts that the plaintiff
was harassed. By not addressing the plaintiff herself, the ex-
pert in Robinson only gave the judge guidance in matters con-
cerning the perspectives of women. It was still for the fact-
finder to determine whether or not the circumstances that
would be harassing actually existed.
189. Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 129 F.R.D. 655, 667 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
190. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
191. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1507 n.4
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
192. Id.
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In Robinson, the court also allowed for testimony which
involved "expert opinion that sexually harassing conditions
for female employees exist at [defendant employer]. 193 But
here the ultimate issue was again avoided. The expert did
not testify that the Plaintiff had been subjected to these con-
ditions. This was still for the judge to determine.1 9 4
The essential problem perceived in allowing experts to
address ultimate issues of fact is that such testimony invades
the province of the jury or judge as fact-finder. But the essen-
tial facts of a given case, i.e., did the alleged behavior take
place, will always be determined by the fact-finder. It is for
the judge or jury to decide which witnesses it believes, and
which factual evidence is most compelling. It is true that if
the parties were to stipulate to the facts, and were merely in
disagreement over whether or not those facts included an in-
cidence of harassment, the role of the expert would come
closer to addressing the ultimate issue of the case. Admit-
tedly, there is little difference between an expert describing
"hypothetical" circumstances that in the expert's view would
constitute harassment, and testifying that the facts before
the court constitute harassment. In this sense the ultimate
issue is addressed. It must therefore be accepted that often
testimony as to what constitutes the reasonable woman in
many circumstances will be the crux of litigation, and will ad-
dress the ultimate issue before the jury. But according to
Rule 704, this is not per se a cause for exclusion. And the
extent to which this might mislead or otherwise improperly
influence the jury must be weighed against the extent to
which it is of aid to the jury. Given the above discussion of
the differing perspectives of men and women, and the legal
recognition of those differing perspectives that is embodied in
the reasonable woman standard, the helpfulness of the expert
testimony certainly outweighs any deleterious effects. It
must be remembered that Rule 704 exists to allow for the
introduction of testimony which is helpful to the jury despite
that fact that it addresses the ultimate issue.1 95
193. Id. at 1506.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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4. Policy Considerations
There are policy considerations that weigh against the
admissibility of such evidence as is addressed in this com-
ment. The reasonable woman standard recognizes a problem:
that men do not generally understand the perspectives of wo-
men with regard to sexual context. Therefore, it is impossible
to apply a reasonableness standard that does not recognize
these differing perspectives. In a perfect world men would
understand women's perspectives (or perhaps the perspec-
tives would be the same among the two genders). But what
men do not find offensive women often do. This is a reality
that can be addressed by the use of expert witnesses. But in
using the experts, the court implies that men cannot, without
aid, understand the woman's perspective. In this sense the
court legitimizes men's failure to recognize women's view-
points; it codifies and entrenches the differing perspectives,
even as it seeks to mitigate their effects.
The alternative, allowing men to blindly search for the
standard of the reasonable woman, is not acceptable. The
courts must deal with the realities that are presented to it.
To do otherwise would be to prefer a legal fiction, that men do
understand the perspective of women, to the realization of
justice that expert witnesses can help ensure.
A policy consideration that directly stands for allowing
such testimony involves the common complaint that men do
not know what kind of behavior is and is not acceptable. In a
litigation context, this argument is irrelevant. In establish-
ing the reasonable woman standard, the Ellison court moved
the focus of inquiry from harasser to victim, and thereby
made the harasser's intent irrelevant. 19 6 But in accepting
expert witnesses on the reasonable woman, courts would pro-
vide an opportunity for a legally institutionalized examina-
tion of proper (or at least legal) standards of behavior. In
serving as a forum for examinations of reasonableness, the
courts could illustrate what is and is not harassing behavior
in the workplace. In this way the courts could give men
clearer guidelines, they would be more difficult to attack as
vague or unfair.
196. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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V. Proposal-Additions to the Federal Rules of Evidence
Expert testimony of the type used in Robinson and
sought to be used in Ward, Perkins, and Lipsett should be
admitted. Under the Frye standard, the testimony was re-
quired to be derived from a recognizable standard. The
Daubert interpretation of Rule 702 requires a reliable scien-
tific method. Study of women's behavior, although newer
than other studies currently recognized as fields of expertise,
is an established field. Social framework evidence has been
allowed to address the perspectives and typical responses of
women in circumstances of rape. There is no reason why tes-
timony of a similar type should not be allowed when there are
allegations of sexual harassment. Even more compelling is
the existence of the reasonable woman standard. It is incon-
gruous to accept the reasonable woman standard and simul-
taneously presume that men can reach it on their own. The
reasonable woman standard was adopted to be used by the
courts as a means of recognizing and dealing with the histori-
cal exclusion of women's perspective in society generally and
the courtroom specifically. 197 Given such exclusion, how can
these perspectives be understood by a jury that has not been
educated by experts? It is equally incongruous to accept that
a workplace is a special environment, but not allow experts
to explain what it is like to be within that environment.
Given the necessity of the expert testimony addressed in
this comment, its admissibility should be ensured through an
addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence. An excellent
model is the aforementioned California statute which allows
for the introduction of evidence concerning battered women's
syndrome.198
The amendment to the Rules should first include a state-
ment that expert testimony will be admissible in sexual har-
assment cases brought under Title VII when it is introduced
to show those circumstances that would for a reasonable wo-
man create a sexually hostile, offensive, or intimidating work
environment. Second, there must be a standard for the ex-
perts themselves. The California statute uses the following
language: "The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of
197. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
198. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 1993); see supra text accompanying note
166.
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this expert testimony if the proponent of the evidence estab-
lishes its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert
witness."1 99 Although the language, "proper qualifications,"
is very flexible, judicial subversion of the intent of the statute
would be prevented by a third section of the statute: "Expert
opinion testimony on the reasonable woman as the standard
is applied to sexual harassment shall not be considered a
new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven."20 0
This would prevent refusal of the evidence on the grounds
that it is not in compliance with the Rule 702 requirement
that expert testimony be based on "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge." It would thus be legitimate
under the new standard of Daubert.
VI. CONCLUSION
The substantive changes to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence listed above would effectively guarantee the admissibil-
ity of established, legitimate, and helpful expert witness tes-
timony in hostile environment sexual harassment cases
utilizing the reasonable woman standard. However, the pos-
sibility of such changes actually being made is slight. First,
the strongest argument for the necessity of these provisions
is the existence of the reasonable woman standard. But this
is not a universally applied standard. Although courts do
tend to judge allegedly harassing behavior according to its ef-
fects on alleged victims, most often women, not all circuits
have explicitly recognized this through an acceptance of Elli-
son's reasonable woman standard.
Secondly, the Federal Rules of Evidence relating to the
admissibility of expert testimony are very general in their
wording. This reflects the deference given to judges by appel-
late courts evaluating rulings on the admissibility of expert
testimony. A rule as explicit as that outlined above would not
be in keeping with the general language of the Rules or the
deference this general language helps to ensure.
The faint hope for a statute such as that outlined above
does not mean that those who seek to introduce the testimony
addressed here will not be allowed to do so. As sexual harass-
ment cases become more common, those who study it will be-
199. CAL. EVD. CODE § 1107(b) (West 1993).
200. See id.
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come more recognized. As the field of study grows, so will the
acceptability of experts in the field. Eventually, most courts
will be able to make the same determinations that were made
by the Robinson court, and allow for the admission of the tes-
timony. As awareness of sexual harassment and the differing
perspectives of men and women grow, the acceptance of this
testimony will increase. Ironically, if this awareness is over-
estimated, the experts may appear unnecessary. If the ex-
pert testimony here discussed is to be introduced, judges
must understand the difference between recognizing the
existence of differing perspectives and understanding the per-
spectives themselves.
Jeremy D. Pasternak

